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FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN A MULTILINGUAL STATE: 
THE CASE OF SLOVENE CORPORATE BANKING 
IN AUSTRIA, 1900 - 1912* 
Toussaint Hocevar 
Within Austria, by which I mean the Cisleithan portion of the Dual Monarchy, the 
generally prosperous years between 1898 and 1912 were marked in the banking 
industry by two opposing developments. On the one hand, there was a tendency for the 
concentration of financial capital in the hands of large Vienna banks. On the other, this 
period witnessed the rapid growth of corporate banking within the non-German terri-
tories of Austria and the emergence of new financial centers, Prague in particular. It 
is this second development which is unique for Austria, reflecting its multi-ethnic 
composition. 
The evolution of Czech banking during Austria's industrialization has been 
researched by Richard L. Rudolph. I Another study by Bernard MicheI/ covering 
banking within the entire Austrian portion of the Habsburg Monarchy since the turn 
of the century, examines the banking activity against the background of the strivings 
of the Czechs, Slovenes and other Austrian Slavs for their national and economic 
emancipation. However, neither author attempts to link the observed autonomous 
tendencies in banking to the causes inherent in the coalescence of regional linguistic 
distinctiveness and the communication-intense nature of financial intermediation. It is 
the purpose of this paper to explore the reasons for the emergence of ethnically specific 
financial institutions, using Slovene corporate banking within Austria as an example. 
RESEARCH SOURCES 
The sources for the study of Slovene joint-stock banks are not abundant. The only 
archival item which I have been able to locate in Slovenia is a hand-written, leather-
bound volume inscribed "Kronika Ljubljanske kreditne banke", preserved in the Zgo-
dovinski Arhiv Ljubljana under the signature "Zbirka Dusana Omahna." In this 
official chronicle, activities of the Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka are summarized on an 
annual basis for the period 1900-1941. 
Another item in the aforementioned collection by Dusan Omahen is the typescript 
"Zgodovina slovenskih bank" by Drago Potocnik. The author, who served as economic 
editor of the Ljubljana daily Slovenec during the interwar period, apparently com-
pleted his manuscript before 1946. It is a detailed history of individual Slovene banks 
and of branches of outside banks in Slovenia up to 1943. In the statistical appendix to 
Potocnik's study one finds annual balance sheet data for the Ljubljana banks. There is 
also a listing of the officers of each bank and of the period of their service. The part 
which covers the period before 1913 was published in the late 1930s,3 when Potocnik 
also pu blished a shorter survey of Slovene banking.4 His survey of t he effects of World 
War II on Slovene banking was published in mimeographed form after the war. 5 
The series of annual reports of major banks can be pieced together from holdings in 
the Narodna in Univerzitetna Knjiznica, the Centralna Ekonomska Knjiznica and the 
Narodna Banka Slovenije all in Ljubljana but some lacunae remain. 
In TrstjTrieste, the historical section of the Narodna in Studijska Knjiznica pre-
serves a portion of the archive of ladranska Banka. Included are items of corres-
pondence with clients, providing insight into the terms of loan contracts. The minutes 
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of meetings of the administrative council and of other bodies of the bank are not now 
included in the archive, even though, in 1965, Bozidar Kosmin examined the archive 
and summarized the information he found in the minutes of the meetings of the 
administrative council and in the minutes of the shareholders' meetings for the period 
1905-1912. Kosmin transmitted his summary, along with the original minutes, to a 
recipient whose identity can not be established on the basis of a copy of the summary 
included in the archive collection. 
In Vienna, the Finanzarchiv preserves documents submitted by the Interior 
Ministry to the Finance Ministry as part of the procedure for governmental approval 
of incorporation of joint-stock companies. Such files are available for all three Slovene 
joint-stock banks of the Austrian period, namely Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka 
(founded in Ljubljana in 1900), ladranska Banka (Trieste, 1905) and I1irska Banka 
(Ljubljana, 1916). Included are listings of initial capital stock subscribers and listings 
of holders of shares submitted for voting at each meeting of the constituent share-
holders. 
Information on Slovene banks is included in information on banks in Austria, and 
later in Yugoslavia, in individual volumes of Compass: Finanzielles Jahrbuch, the 
Austrian equivalent of Standard & Poor's financial guides. Moreover, statistical data 
for all Austrian banks have been published in special volumes of the Osterreichische 
Statistik. 6 Some historical information is included in articles pertaining to Slovene 
banking which appeared in Bankarstvo (Zagreb) during the 1920s. 
The aforementioned secondary sources by Potocnik and Michel have been recently 
augmented by articles in which I have treated in detail the financial aspects of Slovene 
corporate banking up to 1941 7 and its innovative role up to 1930.8 
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Since the differentiation among various ethnic groups constituting Austria was 
drawn along linguistic lines, and since linguistic policy occupied a central place in 
Austrian politics, it seems appropriate to focus on the linguistic aspect of interethnic 
relations. Moreover, this aspect lends itself to economic analysis because in a multi-
lingual environment the choice of language used in any given functional domain can be 
evaluated on the basis of relative costs. 
Take a linguistic region in which a second, dominant language is being used as the 
vehicle of communication in domains associated with such service activities as public 
administration, secondary and/or higher education, and banking. This imposes the 
cost of learning the dominant language upon members of the indigenous population 
aspiring to occupations from which their language is excluded. Under conditions of a 
traditional , stationary economy, the explicit as well as implicit costs incurred by 
learners of the second, dominant language are in the aggregate likely to be less than the 
cost of additional resources needed to introduce the indigenous language into the 
domains from which it is excluded. However, as in the course of economic development 
employment in urban service activities increases, the substitution of the dominant 
language by the indigenous, regional one may become the rational solution. 
Such a solution is likely to be resisted by the dominant language group which derives 
external benefits from the fact that others are investing in the learning of the dominant 
language. These external benefits are analogous to the extension of telephone service 
that is provided by new subscribers for existing subscribers, by increasing at no cost to 
the latter the number of available communication channels. 
The preceding model, which I have treated in greater detail elsewhere,9 allows for 
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viewing the nationalities struggle in Austria as a conflict which hinged on the distri-
bution of costs and benefits associated with any given linguistic arrangement. Until the 
flaring-up of the linguistic conflict, which paralleled economic development and 
modernization in evidence during the nineteenth century, the configuration of 
linguistic domains within the various Austrian provinces remained relatively stable. In 
regions in which one of the Slavic languages was the popular language, German played 
the role of the dominant institutional language. As long as the traditional economy 
prevailed, this linguistic arrangement could be maintained, with each of the two 
languages meeting the communication needs of a distinct but relatively stable 
socio-economic group. German was used in activities at the upper end of the occupa-
tional and social hierarchy, while indigenous languages served broad masses of the 
population. 10 A bilingual group facilitated the relatively limited amount of communi-
cation between the two spheres. 
An economic consequence, of the linguistic conditions described was that individuals 
whose primary language was not German had to assume the cost of learning German 
in order to enter occupations from which their language was excluded. As long as 
opportunities for upward social mobility remained limited, the aggregate social cost of 
such linguistic adaptation did not loom large. The situation changed as in the course 
of modern economic development occupational and social mobility as well as the 
communication flows increased, and with this the aggregate cost of linguistic 
adaptation. Under such conditions, making the leading institutions conform linguis-
tically to the broad popular mases became a less costly solution than assuming the 
mounting social costs of learning German as a second language. 
The urgency of substituting German by indigenous languages varied directly with 
the intensity of communications in a given activity. I note that service activities tend to 
be more communication-intense than activities involving material production. Thus an 
extractive industry falls at the lower end of the communication-intensity spectrum, 
especially if the service components of the production and distribution process, such as 
financing and marketing, are detached from physical production. Since the latter 
requires a minimal amount of communication, it can be carried out in a non-dominant 
language region without upsetting the traditonal dominant vs. non-dominant language 
balance. 
The opposite applies to communication-intense pure service activities, such as 
financial intermediation, with which this paper is concerned. By singling out just one 
facet of financial intermediation, that of lending, it becomes immediately apparent 
that the volume of communications associated with establishing the credit-worthiness 
of the borrower and negotiating and securing a loan is significant. Also, the smaller the 
average loan, the greater the amount of communications associated with a given 
volume of business. It follows that institutions specializing in small business and 
agricultural lending require a relatively larger volume of communications than, say, 
investment banks, even though the respective information flows may not be of com-
parable complexity. 
Small wonder that German-Austrian institutional financial intermediaries failed to 
penetrate the Slavic countryside, and that this task fell entirely to indigenous initiative. 
Thus the problem of institutionalizing regional languages was not limited to substi-
tuting German by regional languages in existing institutions such as public admini-
stration, but extended to new institutions essential to modern development. 
My earlier empirical research, based on data for the Slovene lands, tends to confirm 
the positive linkage between institutionalization of regional languages and economic 
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growth. In lands with favorable conditions for the institutionalization of Slovene, 
especially in Carniola, the rise in the share of non-agricultural population during the 
period between 1880 and 1910 was more pronounced than where such institutiona-
lization was being hampered by German-Austrian opposition, as, for example, in 
Slovene Carinthia. II 
As for financial intermediation per se, David F. Good l2 has shown that between 
1880 and 1910, at any level of savings per capita, the rate of interest was systematically 
higher in non-German than in German linguistic regions of Austria. In his discussion 
of an earlier version of this paper, Professor Good remarked that higher communi-
cation costs of German-Austrian financial intermediaries provide a reasonable 
explanation of the observed interest-rate differentials. The fact that in Austria the 
interest bias observed by Good declined over time, reinforces the linguistic hypothesis: 
by adopting regional languages the emerging Slavic banks lowered communication 
costs, thus increasing the institutional supply of loanable funds. 
Finally, J.W. Christian and E. Pagoulatosl 3 found a greater rate of accumulation in 
developing countries with their own institutional financial intermediation than in 
countries depending on foreign intermediaries. The causal nexus may again lie with 
linguistic difference, although this aspect has not been treated explicitly by the au-
thors. 
INTEGRATING THE PRIMARY CIRCUITS OF CAPITAL SUPPLY 
Narrowing the focus to the Slovene scene, one can observe that the drive for the 
institutionalization of Slovene paralleled the economic transformation during the 
second part of the nineteenth century, and it gained momentum as the pace of ec-
onomic growth quickened during ther first decade of this century. 14 The changes were 
ushered in by the Vienna-Trieste railroad, which reached Ljubljana in 1849. Con-
struction of additional lines continued into the twentieth century and was financed by 
both state and private capital. 
In the wake of the railroads there sprung up modern industries which supplanted 
smaller traditional enterprises and expanded the utilization of existing human and 
natural resources. Although most of these industries were started by local entre-
preneurs, their expansion depended on outside capital, leading to ultimate absorption 
or control by firms located outside the region, in centers affording external economies 
in financing and marketing. Thus the expansion of coal mining in the Trbovlje Basin 
took place under the aegis of Trifailer Kohlenwerkgesellschaft, a Vienna-based 
corporation, which acquired the existing mines from local owners in 1873. The modern 
paper industry in the Ljubljana Basin, a creation of the local entrepeneur Fidelis 
Terpinc, was consolidated with Leykam of Vienna into Leykam-Josefsthal AG in 
1870. In 1891, the Berlin bank Born und Busse acquired controlling interest in the 
Jesenice steel complex of the Krainische Industriegesellschaft of Ljubljana. 
Inflow of outside capital into large-scale industries indicates that on the supply side 
Slovene lands were linked to the Austrian and international industrial capital market. 
However, this inflow of capital was at least in part offset by exports of capital by a few 
existing local financial intermediaries, the largest of which was the Krainische 
Sparkasse of Ljubljana. Its liabilities consisted in the main of local savings deposits, 
while on the assets side securities (public bonds and annuities) issued outside of 
Slovene lands figured prominently. The ability of this German-language savings bank 
to attract local deposits reflects the relatively low communication content of the 
depository activity. On the other hand, the bank's preference for outside securities over 
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communication-intense investment in the local mortgage market suggests a linguistic 
barrier attributable to the dominant vs. non-dominant language dichotomy. The 
degree of linguistic impermeability of German-language financial intermediaries is 
well illustrated by the policy of a similar savings bank in Celje, the Sparkasse der 
Stadtgemeinde, which refused mortgage loans on any property for which the official 
title abstracts were issued in Slovene. 15 The response of Slovenes, who controlled the 
political districts surrounding Celje, was to organize their own savings bank in that 
city, Juznostajerska Hranilnica, in 1889. Similar savings banks, referred to as regula-
tivne hranilnice because they operated under regulations issued by the Court Chancel-
lery in 1843, were organized by Slovenes in other towns. Deposits in these public 
institutions, of which the Mestna Hranilnica Ljubljanska (founded in 1887) was the 
largest, were guaranteed by local governments. Deposited funds were channeled into 
loans for construction of local housing, schools, and public utilities. The contrast with 
local German savings banks, which exported capital, emerges from a comparison of the 
ratio of mortgages and loans to securities, which, for 1908, was 4.18 for the Mestna 
Hranilnica Ljubljanska and 1.58 for the Krainische Sparkasses. 16 
The establishment of public savings banks in urban centers was paralleled by the 
development of a network of lending cooperatives in the countryside, where the 
demand for credit had been previously met by local usurers in a highly fragmented 
market. By 1910 the number of credit cooperatives reached 543, covering the entire 
Slovene ethnic territory in Austria from DjeksejDiex in the north to Trieste and Koper 
in the south. Lending cooperatives lowered financial costs in the countryside by 
spreading the risk according to the "law of large numbers" and by standardizing 
certain types of transactions. Moreover, in comparison to individual lenders, the 
default risk was reduced by better expertise.17 These advantages were further en-
hanced by financial services provided by larger city-based lending cooperatives and by 
cooperative federations to smaller lending cooperatives. 
By lowering transaction costs and by mobilizing consumers' savings, the cooper-
atives were able to provide loans at a low rate of interest. As early as 1884, a survey of 
lending conditions conducted by the Carniolan provincial government revealed that 
interest rates charged by individual private lenders ranged between 10% and 24%,18 
while interest charged by lending cooperatives averaged only 6%.19 As the number of 
lending cooperatives increased, beneficial effects began to be felt throughout the farm 
and small-business sector. Functioning as a system, the lending cooperatives brought 
about the integration of the primary capital supply circuits, an indispensable part of 
overall economic development and modernization.20 
THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE BANKING 
The extension of financial capillaries to farms and other households through lending 
cooperatives was followed by the development of a higher stage of financial inter-
mediation through the introduction of corporate, joint-stock banks. These institutions, 
which provided both short-term commercial credit and facilities for long-term cor-
porate financing , were traditionally concentrated in Vienna: as late as 1897, joint-stock 
banks outside of Vienna accounted for only 18 percent of the total capital stock of all 
joint-stock banks.21 Thus, with the exception of Prague and possibly Trieste, the 
provinces were conspicuous by the absence of what has been referred to as Bank-
kultur. 22 German-Austrian and Slovene Alpine lands did not differ in this respect. 
Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg and Carinthia had no corporate banks at all. In Styria, the 
Steirische Eskomptebank of Graz was of modest size, as was the Marburger 
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Eskomptebank of Maribor. In Carniola, the sugar crisis of 1884 had forced the 
Krainische Escomptegesellschaft of Ljubljana to close its doors in 1885. Trieste, 
although boasting its own banking tradition, was by 1890 no longer functioning as an 
intermediary between Austrian and Italian financial markets; and the local Banca 
Commerciale Triestina was losing ground to Viennese branch banks even before it 
came under the control of the Wiener Bankverein in 1904?3 
Against this background the emergence of Slovene corporate banking in 1900, and 
its subsequent rapid growth, appear somewhat paradoxical, unless one takes into 
account the specific social developments sketched in the preceding sections. As early as 
1872 a Maribor publisher-politician, lanko Pajk, anticipating the qualitative growth of 
indigenous financial intermediation, declared: "Let us organize lending cooperatives, 
and they will be soon followed by banks. Until we develop our own financial insti-
tutions, we will be far from national independence.,,24 
To be translated into action, such visions required a coalescence of economic inter-
ests, which could be found in the demand for credit by medium-size commercial 
enterprises on the one hand and the expansion of Czech capital beyond the boundaries 
of Bohemia on the other. I note that Ljubljana wholesalers represented the largest 
group, 29 percent, of individual subscribers to the initial stock offering of the Ljubl-
janska Kreditna Banka [hereafter LKBJ, which was incorporated in Ljubljana in 
1900. Merchants, craftsmen and manufacturers comprised 21 percent, professionals 
another 21 percent, administrators 17 and land-owners 12 percent. 25 Clearly, 
medium-sized local businesses were interested in a Ljubljana-based corporate bank. 
However, in the total initial stock offering of the LKB, individual subscribers repre-
sented only 36 percent, and nearly all of them limited their investment to ten shares, or 
4,000 crowns. The fact that investors were less than sanguine about investing in this, 
or for that matter in any joint-stock company, is in part explainable by the failure of 
an earlier Slovene corporate venture, Prva Obcna Zavarovalna Banka Slovenija. This 
insurance company, which had been founded in 1871, during the prosperous Grunder-
zeit, and which had opened offices throughout Austria, could not survive the de-
pression which followed the Vienna financial crash of 1873.26 The failure of Slovenija 
left a bitter aftertaste among investors, and weakened confidence in joint-stock compa-
nies, as did similar failures in other parts of Austria. 
v 
Fifty percent of the initial capital stock of the LKB was taken up by Zivnostenska 
Banka of Prague, reflecting the interregional expansion of Czech banking, a process 
which started with the opening of Zivnostenska's Vienna branch in 1898.27 For Ljubl-
jana, too, the initial plan called for a branch bank; but due to the initiative of Ivan 
v 
Hribar, the mayor of Ljubljana and the first president of the LKB, Zivnostenska opted 
for financial participation in the LKB by its own Vienna branch, instead of opening its 
own branch in Ljubljana. 28 This decision, incidentally, coincided with a general glut of 
liquidity during the economic lull of 1900, which sent capital to the provinces in search 
of higher yields than those offered in the Vienna money market. In addition to this 
initial Czech capital transfer, cooperation with the Czechs proved beneficial because it 
v 
resulted in a transfer of know-how as well: several former officers of Zivnostenska 
provided a succession of the LKB's managing directors, transmitting financial 
expertise to a generation of Slovene bankers. 
Finally, eight percent of the initial stock offering of the LKB was subscribed by 
cooperatives. As in the case of individual subscribers, the investment by the cooperative 
sector lagged behind its financial strength. It was not until 1917 that a corporate bank 
was founded by cooperatives, namely, the Ilirska Banka of Ljubljana; in it the Ljudska 
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Posojilnica, an important lending cooperative, held 40 percent of the capital stock. 29 By 
this time lending cooperatives, operating under statutory restrictions, could no longer 
provide the entire range of financial services demanded by the evolving cooperative 
sector, hence the tendency to enter joint-stock banking . 
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The earlier cautiousness of Slovene investors was soon overcome in view of the 
succesful performance of the LKB: between 1900 and 1912 the bank was able to place 
several successive stock issues at a premium, increasing its capital stock from the initial 
0.5 million crowns to 8 million crowns. 
From Ljubljana the Slovene banking initiative spread to Trieste with the founding 
there of the ladranska Banka in 1905. This time individual investors subscribed to 60 
percent of the initial stock offering. Banks were represented with 36 percent, namely 
the LKB with 16 and several Croatian banks with 20 percent. Lending cooperatives 
accounted for 4 percent, with the TrZaska Posojilnica holding one-half of this share. 
The geographic distribution of investors shows that 31 percent of the initial capital 
came from Trieste, 24 percent from the Slovene interior and 44 percent from Croatia 
proper and Dalmatia.30 ladranska grew rapidly so that by 1912 its capital stock 
reached 8 million crowns, equalling that of the LKB as well as that of the older Banca 
Commerciale Triestina. 
THE SCOPE OF SLOVENE BANKING 
The growth of the Austrian banking industry during the period between the ec-
onomic upsurge of 1898 and the beginning of World War I in 1914 was accompanied 
by a concentration of capital in the hands of the large Vienna banks. In the provinces 
this process made itself felt (1) by the acquisition of non-corporate private banks and 
their transformation into branches, and (2) by the absorption of joint-stock provincial 
banks into so-called communities of interest' (Interessengemeinschaften), dominated 
by Vienna banks. 
The budding Slovene banking ran counter to those tendencies by extending its 
services to an ethnic market that German-Austrian banks had failed to develop. In fact 
the Viennese banks may have perceived the potential significance of this market only 
after the LKB was off to a successful start, for it was after the appearance of the LKB 
on the banking scene that two Viennese banks established their branches in Ljubljana: 
the Creditanstalt, by buying out the local private bank of L.C. Luckmann in 1906; and 
the Verkehrsbank by acquiring that of Emerich Mayer in 1908.31 In Carinthia, too, 
Viennese capital moved in on the heels of the LKB, which was the first corporate bank 
to establish itself in CelovecjKlagenfurt in 1904. Soon afterwards the Creditanstalt 
transformed the private bank Suppan into its Klagenfurt branch.32 
In addition to Klagenfurt, the branch network of the LKB included Split, Trieste, 
Sarajevo, Gorica and Celje. The existence of LKB's branch in Trieste and that of the 
ladranska Banka in Ljubljana shows that the two banks were not hesitant to compete 
for business in the others' respective home cities. Elsewhere, the branching out by the 
ladranska Banka concentrated on Dalmatia, for which Trieste served as the main 
economic link with the rest of Austria. The expansion in Dalmatia was facilitated 
through the mergers of Hrvatska Vjeresijska Banka in Dubrovnik and of Hrvatska 
-Bokeljska Stedionica in Kotor with the ladranska Banka in 1911. Through these 
-
mergers the Trieste bank acquired branches in Dubrovnik, Split, Sibenik, Zadar and 
Kotor. Also in 1911, it opened a branch in Metkovic, the sea outlet for Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Of longer standing was ladranska Banka's branch in Opatija, conveni-
ently located in the immediate vicinity of Hungary's sea outlet of RijekajFiume. 
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Finally, in 1914, the ladranska Banka opened its branch in Vienna, establishing a 
direct link with the financial capital of the Empire, as had been done earlier by Czech 
banks. Thus the integra tion of financial markets was not a unidirectional process, that 
is, one that was carried out exclusively through the branching out by Viennese banks. 
Rather, financial integration proceeded in the opposite direction as well, reflecting 
developments in the ethnically specific regional markets. 
While they were differentiated along ethnic lines, the banks in Austria were not 
specialized by banking activity. By the turn of the century they evolved into universal 
banks, true maids of all work' (Madchenfur alles). Unlike the banks in France, which 
according to their specialization could be divided into commercial and investment 
banks of the Credit Mobilier type, Austrian banks successfully combined short-term 
commercial lending with long-term industrial financing. Moreover, because of the 
relatively weak wholesale sector, they often engaged in commodity trading as well. 
The charters of both the LKB and the ladranska Banka provided for a full range of 
banking services. In addition to commercial lending, both banks soon began organizing 
new joint-stock companies and underwriting stock issues, although their own holdings 
of such securities never attained significant proportions. Corporate ventures in which 
Slovene banks participated were medium-size enterprises in the food industry 
(breweries in Senozece and Lasko, a sugar refinery in Osijek), in metalworking (the 
manufacturing of shotguns in Borovlje/Ferlach), and a brick kiln in Ilirska Bistrica. 
Corporations in the service and transportation sector included the forwarding and 
brokerage firm Balkan and the steamship companies Dalmatia and Oceania, all in 
Trieste.33 
Although these firms failed to match in size large externally controlled enterprises 
in mining and paper manufacturing, the fact that their financing was arranged within 
the region signaled a departure from the established practice of channeling industrial 
investment through Vienna. The importance of this qualitative change became fully 
apparent after World War I, when Slovene banks took on the task of reorganizing 
foreign-owned industries into locally-incorporated enterprises. 
Commercial credit was, of course, the mainstay of business for both banks. The fact 
that they operated in a largely uncharted territory, populated by a number of small- to 
medium-size new firms, explains the relative lack of sophistication in their financial 
techniques. Well-secured loans were preferred to unsecured Biancokredit, which was 
typical of Vienna banks lending to established large firms. For example, when in 1912 
the ladranska Banka extended a 50,000 crown loan to Fr. Primc, a Trieste wholesaler, 
the bill of exchange was co-signed by no fewer than five persons and the loan was 
secured with a second mortgage on one of Primc's properties. Concurrently the bank 
opened to this client a credit line of 250,000 crowns for advances on accounts receiva-
ble. The interest was set at 1.5 percentage points above the discount rate of the 
note-issuing Austro-Hungarian bank, with a minimum of 5.5 percent. In addition, the 
ladranska Banka collected 0.25% commission on all of Primc's sales, as well as a 
separate commission amounting to 10% of his annual net profits. In a similar loan 
agreement, reached early in 1914, the interest premium was lowered by 1 percentage 
point and the commission on profits from 10% to 5%. On this occasion the credit was 
secured by all claims and inventories of the firm.34 
The commission the bank collected on Primc's sales goes to show that it participated 
in business ventures to an extent the examination of its balance sheet fails to indicate. 
Moreover, the ladranska Banka engaged in commodity trading as well, since its 
Ljubljana branch operated a special department for trading in sugar. 
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SLOVENE BANKS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A comparison of the assets structure of Slovene banks with that of the Vienna and 
Prague banks, as displayed in the table below, shows the evolution of bank credit from 
the initial stages of development, as exemplified by the young Slovene banks, to a 
higher stage attained by the Czech banks, and finally to the mature stage of the Vienna 
banks. In the case of the Slovene banks, advances on securities and goods represented 
32% of their assets, as against corresponding values of 7% and 6% respectively for the 
Czech and Vienna banks. The order is reversed when it comes to the proportion of 
debtors on current account (tekoCi racun, Kontokorrent), which represents the type of 
intermediation that allowed for substantial economies of scale, since in current account 
lending the evaluation of each separate loan is replaced by the overall evaluation of 
large established firms borrowing on a continuous basis. With 50% of assets in this 
category, the Czech banks were approaching the Viennese share of 65%, while the 
Slovenes with 33% remained a distant third. 
Table 1 
SELECTED ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF VIENNESE, CZECH 
AND SLOVENE JOINT-STOCK BANKS, 1912 (in percent) 
ASSETS 
Total short-term credit 
Debtors on current account 
Bills of exchange 




































"Six major banks: Anglo-Osterreichische Bank, Creditanstalt, Osterreichische Land-
erbank, Union-Bank, Niederosterreichische Escomptegesellschaft, and 
Wiener-Bank-Verein. 
bThis entry consists primarily (and in the case of Slovene banks exclusively) of trans-
ferable deposits, namely takoCi racuni / Kontokorrent and ziro racuni / Giro. 
Sources: Richard L. Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization in Austria-Hungary: the 
Role of Banks in the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976): 81-85; annual reports of the 
LKB and the ladranska Banka. 
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An inspection of financial sources, that is liabilities, reveals similar differences in the 
developmental stage. The Viennese banks relied more heavily on tranferable deposits 
of the Kontokorrent or Giro account type (57%) than did either the Czech (43%) or the 
Slovene banks (23%). In constrast, time deposits represented only 10% for the Vi-
ennese, but 19% for the Czech and 23% for the Slovene banks. Because of the pre-
scribed ratio of primary capital to time deposits, the higher share of savings deposits in 
the case of the Slovene banks implied a higher ratio of equity to borrowed funds and, 
consequently, a lower financial leverage. 
After twelve years of its existence, in 1912, Slovene banking represented 3.5% of 
capital stock of all Austrian joint-stock banks outside Vienna.35 Although this share 
was less than proportional to the 4.5% share of Slovenes in the Austrian population/6 
the lag in the development of corporate banking was more than offset by the relative 
importance of Slovene lending cooperatives and public savings banks. Their combined 
assets of over 400 million crowns, representing over 5% of assets of such institutions in 
Austria, by far outweighed the coresponding value of 63 million crowns for corporate 
banks.37 In terms of total assets, this subordinate role of corporate banks in the Slovene 
financial system is attributable to their newness on the financial scene and at the same 
time indicative of their growth potential. The actual continuation of growth was 
thwarted by the recession which set in with the outbreak of the First Balkan war in 
1912. There followed a severe reduction in the real value of bank assets during World 
War 1. Nevertheless, Slovene corporate banks represented the foundation upon which 
a comprehensive system of financial intermediaries could be built during the 1920s. 
Although the services of corporate banks to some extent paralleled those of lending 
cooperatives and savings banks, their current account business and investment 
financing added a new dimension to Slovene financial intermediation, providing 
important external economies to firms in the region. As in the case of lending coopera-
tives and savings banks, the linguistic specialization seems to have been a significant 
element in the success of Slovene joint-stock banks. After all, they served a Slovene-
speaking clientele which had been largely bypassed by German-Austrian financial 
intermediation. In time, even German-Austrian intermediaries such as the Krainische 
Sparkasse accepted a modicum of Slovene in their dealings with the public, after 
having experienced massive transfers of deposits to Slovene financial institutions. 
Linguistic specialization, however, should not be equated with financial isolation. 
The multilingual staff of Slovene banks showed a great deal of linguistic accomodation 
when transacting business with non-Slovene parties, thus facilitating the flow of funds 
across ethnic boundaries. The shares of the LKB and of the ladranska Banka were 
traded on the Vienna stock exchange, and both banks participated in various 
inter-bank consortia for underwriting securities. One could argue that linguistic 
specialization not only failed to impede interregional capital flows, but that it actually 
represented a necessary condition for establishing a regional network of institutional 
financial intermediaries first lending cooperatives, and later corporate 
banks without which financial integration would have been impossible to achieve. 
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POVZETEK 
Podobno kot razvoj eeSkega je tudi nagel razvoj slovenskega poslovnega banenistva na pre-
lomu stoletja potekal v nasprotju s koncentracijo avstrijskega banenega kapitala v rokah 
dunajskih velebank. K temu je prispevala komunikacijska intenzivnost storitvenih in se posebej 
finanenih dejavnosti. V primerjavi z nemskimi so imele namree slovenske banke to prednost, da 
jih od komitentov ni loeevala jezikovna pregraja. Tako je sprieo povprasevanja slovenskih 
trgovskih in storitvah Ljubljanski kreditni banke (ustanovljena leta 1900) in Jadranski banki v 
Trstu (1905) uspelo v obdobju pred prvo svetovno vojno naglo poveeati bilaneni vsoti in razSiriti 
podruzniski mreii. Z uvajanjem finanenih storitev, ki so bile zunaj torisea sicer razSirjenih 
zadruznih posojilnic in regulativnih hranilnic, sta omenjeni banki povecali funkcijsko 
razseznost finanenega sektorja na Slovenskem. Struktura njunih bilanenih postavk kaze na 
zacetno razvojno stopnjo blancnega posrednistva, saj je bil delei tekoCih raeunov pri slovenskih 
bankah znatno nizju kot pa pri dunajskih in tudi eeSkih. 
